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Abstract. 
 
 
 
t is common to distinguish two different theorists of time; those who 
maintain a dynamic view of time endorse the idea that time involves 
transition, flow or passage from one temporal object to the next, and 
those who maintain a static view of time that involves unchanging and 
fixed relations between temporal objects, and unchanging (tenseless) 
facts. Based on McTaggart’s article on “The Unreality of Time” and 
chapter on “Time,” from The Nature of Existence, and gaining 
popularity with Richard Gale’s anthology on The Philosophy of Time, 
and book on The Language of Time, the various incarnations of these 
two views have come to be called the A-theory, after McTaggart’s A-
series of events ordered by the A-properties of pastness, presentness and 
futurity, and the B-theory after McTaggart’s B-series of events ordered 
by the B-relations of earlier than and later than.1 One of the purportedly 
strongest arguments in support of the A-theory and against the B-theory 
is based on the phenomenology of temporal experience which is 
dynamic and not static as seemingly required by the B-theory. B-
theorists typically buy into this line of reasoning, if not its conclusion, 
and develop anti-realist (that is, mind-dependent) views of the dynamic 
aspects of temporal experience and reductive analyses of the tenses and 
becoming that are compatible with a static, or four-dimensional, Block 
universe. 
 Ironically, it seems to me, as I shall argue, that without the B-
series, it is the A-theory that is static, and without the A-series it is the 
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B-series, properly understood as the R-series, whose terms are ordered 
by Russellian temporal relations, of which I shall speak more shortly, 
that is dynamic. If these claims are correct then there are three important 
consequences. First, the standard objection to the B/R-theory that it 
leaves out the dynamic aspect of time is mistaken. Second, the claim that 
the A-theory is realist and the B/R-theory anti-realist since it renders 
transition mind-dependent, is also mistaken, and third, if we assume, as I 
believe we should, that an adequate ontology of time must ground both 
the transitory and the eternal aspects of time, then the R-theory is well 
suited to accomplish that task. In order to make good on these claims, I 
will develop a view that I shall call the Russellian theory of time (or “R-
theory” for short) that differs from both the A-theory and the B-theory, 
although I will primarily highlight the differences with (some versions 
of) the B-theory.2 In order to clarify the R-theory I shall distinguish two 
different notions of “realism,” and touch on a third and argue that the R-
theory is realist in all three senses. For that reason, my limited defense of 
the Russellian view can justly be considered to be a defense of temporal 
realism. 
 The reader who is familiar with my writings on time may wonder 
if my talk of the R-theory as different from the B-theory implies that I 
am abandoning the B-theory. The answer is yes and no. “Yes” in that 
there are certain tenets typically associated with the B-theory that I wish 
to deny, for example, that temporal relations are static, and “no” in that 
like the B-theorist, I too reject all A-theoretic accounts of the dynamic 
aspect of time. What I intend to argue, however, is that there is a version 
of the R-theory that holds a combination of views that most B-theorists 
either don’t hold or don’t consider, and that this view can be called 
“temporal realism.” 
 To defend these claims let me begin with the claim that the A-
theory without temporal relations cannot account for the dynamic aspect 
of time and is thus static. Actually, this assertion is not as controversial 
as it might appear since A-theorists beginning with McTaggart and as 
recently as Kit Fine explicitly acknowledge that succession is essential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a detailed consideration of the differences between A-, B- and R-theories see 
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to passage whether construed as the donning and doffing of A-
properties, the successive actualization of possible worlds, the transition 
from one time to the next, or the coming into and going out of existence 
of events. Therefore, without succession (which is nothing other than an 
earlier temporal object being followed by a later one), the A-theory in its 
various embodiments is static and leaves out something essential to time.  
 As Fine puts it: 
 
The passage of time can be taken to consist in the successive 
possession of the absolute property of PRESENT or NOW. This 
property passes as it were from one moment to the next and it is in its 
passage […] that the passage of time can be taken to consist.3 
 
 Fine understands passage in terms of the successive possession by 
moments of the property of presentness and for that reason the tensed 
fact that a particular time to has the property of presentness is alone 
insufficient to provide an adequate ground for the passage of time. He 
explicitly makes this point in the following passage: 
 
But although the realist possesses the right concept of the present in 
terms of which an explanation of the proposed sort might be given, he 
does not possess the right metaphysics by reference to which it might 
actually be sustained. For all he can properly say is that a particular 
time t0, which happens to be present, possesses the absolute property 
of being present. But what we wanted was the successive possession of 
the property of being present, not merely its current possession.4 
 
 He continues: 
 
His [the tense realist] conception of temporal reality, for all that he 
has said, may be as static or block-like as the antirealist’s, the only 
difference lying in the fact that his block has a privileged “center”.5 
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 In the rest of the paper (see also his book, Fine 2005) Fine 
develops two non-standard accounts of realism to account for the 
successive possession of presentness, but the point I want to emphasize 
is that Fine clearly believes that tense realism alone is insufficient for 
temporal realism since tensed facts are insufficient to give us passage or 
distinguish space from time. In order to ground the dynamic aspect of 
time we must have an adequate account of succession or the transition 
from earlier to later temporal objects.6  
 What then are the proper metaphysical analyses of succession (or 
temporal relations) and the transitory or dynamic aspect of time? 
Consider this question first with regard to the realism/idealism issue: Are 
temporal relations and the transitory aspect of time mind-independent or 
mind-dependent? There is a superficial agreement between the B- and R-
theory on this issue since they are both realist with regard to temporal 
relations. However R-relations are importantly different from B-relations 
as they are usually understood. For Russellians, temporal relations are 
given in experience as phenomenologically simple relations and thus are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As is well known McTaggart also argues that in order for there to be time and 
change events must pass through time by having A-characteristics successively. 
Since, however, events cannot have A-characteristics successively he concludes that 
time is unreal. For my interpretation of the argument see Oaklander 2004. The need 
for succession to account for the transitory aspect of time is also implied by William 
Lane Craig’s account of temporal becoming. For Craig, temporal becoming is 
modeled on the different members of the A-series coming into existence 
successively, as successive times become present. He says, “the doctrine of 
objective becoming […] could be graphically displayed as the successive 
actualization of the history of the actual world. It is this model of a successively 
instantiated, rather than tenselessly existing, actual world that precludes the 
existence of a “totality of facts” (Craig 2000, 207, emphasis added.) The appeal to 
succession implies the existence of temporal relations, and thus without temporal 
relations Craig’s presentist world is static and not dynamic. Similarly, in a recent 
paper, Yuval Dolev claims that “On the anti-reductive account, transience has to do 
with events’ becoming present after having been future and before becoming past” 
(Dolev 2012, 70, emphasis added.) Thus, without the before/after relation(s) 
transience would not exist.  
	  
	  
	  
	  
5 
taken as unanalyzable and irreducible, mind-independent entities in the 
ontology of time.7  
 In calling temporal relations unanalyzable a Russellian means that 
they cannot be reduced to the properties of their terms and, indeed, the 
terms of temporal relations have no intrinsically temporal properties 
such as pastness, presentness and or futurity, since there are none. R-
relations are not analyzable, as in McTaggart, in the terms of a non-
temporal C-series having temporal properties. On the R-theory, the only 
category of intrinsically temporal entities are relations; there are no 
temporal individuals, such as moments or time points; there are no 
monadic temporal A-properties; and there is no absolute becoming 
understood either as the coming into and going out of existence of 
objects or events, or as the donning and doffing of A-properties. In other 
words, on the R-theory, time is relational, that is, all ontological facts 
about time are understood as grounded in relations and that includes 
durations such as lasts as long as, or lasts longer than. 
 On the other hand, B-theorists typically analyze temporal relations 
in terms of causal relations or the physical relation of entropic increase.8 
On the R-theory there are reasons to reject such grounding. First, the 
phenomenon of temporal succession is fundamental, whereas causation 
and entropy are rather derived and complicated relations. A Russellian 
ontological analysis complies with the principle that a fundamental 
phenomenon such as succession should be grounded on a simple entity 
such as the R-relation if at all possible. Second, Russellians will reject 
causal accounts of the direction of time since they adopt an empirical 
principle of acquaintance according to which we must be acquainted 
with the simple entities of one’s ontology. What excludes causal theories 
of time is that we perceive many temporal successions while we don’t 
perceive the relation “causes” or “has greater entropy than” in those 
cases. Furthermore, R-theorists will argue that causation and entropy are 
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and Tegtmeier 2010; Oaklander 2012. 
8 See Mellor 1998; LePoidevin 1991, and LePoidevin 2007; Armstrong 2009; Smart 
1963; Grünbaum 1973.  
	  
	  
	  
	  
6 
circular as earlier-relations since they presuppose temporal succession 
and the direction of time. 
 B-theorists who do not countenance R-relations typically differ 
from R-theorists regarding the transitory or dynamic aspect of time as 
well. Thus, for example, Laurie Paul sets herself the task of explaining 
how the existence of a static, four-dimensional universe of a series of 
changeless events standing in unchanging temporal relations can explain 
the “flow of successively existing events […] responsible for the 
animated character or flow of change.”9 Paul responds by arguing that 
even in the static universe of the four-dimensionalist the reductionist can 
provide “an account of how temporal experience could arise from the 
way the brains of conscious beings experience and interpret cognitive 
inputs from series of static events.”10 Her explanation goes something 
like this: 
 
When we have an experience as of passage, we can interpret this as an 
experience that is the result of the brain producing a neural state that 
represents inputs from earlier and later temporal stages and simply 
“fills in” the representation of motion or of changes. Thus, according 
to the reductionist, there is no real flow or animation in changes that 
occur across time. Rather, a stage of one’s brain creates the illusion of 
such flow, as the causal effect of prior stages on (this stage of) one’s 
brain.11 
 
 Paul is claiming that our experience as of passage is an illusion, 
and therefore while time seems to pass from one moment to the next it 
does not really do so, it is just a mind-dependent phenomenon with no 
objective reality. Of course, that is a possible position to take, but for the 
Russellian who is a phenomenological realist and maintains that a 
simple, irreducible temporal feature of experience is dynamic, and thus 
needs an ontological ground, there is an alternative.  
 The alternative is to construe the R-theory as not only realist with 
regard to the mind-independent temporal relations, but also realist with 
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10 Paul 2010, 339. 
11 Paul 2010, 352.  
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regard to transition, passage or the dynamic aspect of time. In other 
words, for the Russellian the phenomenology of temporal passage is R-
theoretic, that is, temporal passage or the dynamic aspect of time is 
grounded in a temporal succession or transition from earlier to later 
temporal items that on one of Russell’s earlier views involves an 
intrinsic sense or direction from one relatum to the other.12 Thus, an R-
theorist should not fear that the words ‘temporal succession’ or 
‘transition’ commit them to A-succession or A-transition. Succession is 
not an A-relation, but it is not a static relation either. Succession is not a 
transition from non-existence to existence or from futurity to presentness 
to pastness, but it does not follow that it is no transition at all. A 
transition is a temporal succession of opposite states and succession is 
based on the earlier-than relation.13 A temporal relational fact itself 
doesn’t change (in a sense to be explained below) but may be a change 
and in that sense involves a transition from earlier to later events or 
particulars (or more neutrally, temporal items).  
 That the “is earlier than” relation is dynamic has been argued for 
by Erwin Tegtmeier, whose writings on time have been of great benefit 
and inspiration to me. In the following passage he says: 
 
What we hear according to Russell, when we hear the c-tone 
preceding the d-tone is the relational universal of “occurring earlier 
than” together with its relata. We hear nothing else. Let us assume that 
we don’t recognise the first tone [as] a c and the second as a d. Thus 
we hear only a temporal fact which as such is a dynamic fact […] If 
the fact is dynamic, which one can take for granted, the relational 
universal in it must be dynamic, too. Now, Russell introduces the 
relational universal as the one which holds between the two tones in 
the fact of our example. One can conclude that the relation “occurring 
earlier than” is a dynamic relation.14  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Russell 1903, 95-96. 
13 Cf. Tegtmeier 1999, 62. 
14 Tegtmeier 2010, 42.  
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 On the R-theory as opposed to the typical B-theory, the passage of 
time is rooted in a simple, unanalyzable temporal relation.15 For that 
reason, not only are A-properties incapable of grounding passage 
without the relation of succession, the R-theory with R-relations is 
capable of grounding passage without A-properties. Indeed, given R-
relations there cannot be A-properties, for they would make temporal 
relations dependent on the monadic temporal properties of their terms, 
and consequently not R-relations. Thus while some B-theorists, and their 
critics are willing to characterize their view as “static” or as a block 
universe, R-theorists would reject those appellations. Furthermore, since 
the dynamic “earlier than” relation is mind-independent the claim that 
the R-theory is anti-realist is also mistaken. 
 To clarify the difference between Paul’s version of the B-theory 
and the R-theory it is useful to quote a passage from Russell’s The 
Philosophy of Logical Atomism where he says: 
 
The process of sound philosophizing […] consists mainly in passing 
from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure 
of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and 
analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from, and 
is, so to speak, the real truth of which that vague thing is a sort of 
shadow.16 
 
 What then is the real truth that is the ground of the “flux and flow 
of time?” Do we need an A-theoretic account of passage in terms of say, 
the movement of presentness along a series of fixed events (spotlight 
theory), the accretion of facts with the passage of time (growing block), 
or the coming into and going out of existence (presentism) or will 
something more ontologically austere be able to account for our 
experience of the flow and flux of time? 
 Paul’s B-theoretic move is to make transition something that does 
not exist in the world. On the B-theory there are durationless events that 
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involves transition see Deng 2010, and Savitt 2002. Since Savitt denies that there is 
a difference between A- and B-theories of time I hesitate to call him a B-theorist. 
16 Russell 1956, 179-80. 
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are temporally related, but no objective transition or becoming. Thus, the 
B-theory is called the static view of time because the experience of 
dynamism does not represent any flow from one time to another since 
there is none. The assumption of this line of reasoning is that the only 
kind of objective flow is A-theoretic. Paul’s view is that transition is a 
double illusion. First, it is not a feature of the static events that cause it, 
and furthermore, we are not really aware of transition. Temporal 
phenomena seem to pass, but passage as we experience it is different 
from how it seems. The experience of flow between events “just gives 
the impression of being filled in. There is no ‘figment’ as Dennett would 
say.”17 Thus, the second illusion consists in the fact that what appears to 
be the experience of transition is not really the experience of transition at 
all.18 A weaker form of our experience of passage, compatible with the 
B-theory, is that our experience of the dynamic aspects of time are fully 
real experientially, and they do possess dynamic qualities—the flux and 
flow we find in our experience is not illusion—but what is an illusion is 
the belief that these features of experience represent a mind-independent 
reality that contains metaphysical passage.19 The R-theory rejects both 
the strong (there is no passage phenomenologically or ontologically) and 
weak versions of the B-theory (there is experiential, but no mind-
independent passage) since it affirms that we do experience passage and 
that in so doing we are directly aware of mind-independent—albeit R-
theoretic and not A-theoretic—passage. Thus, the R-theory rejects the 
assumption that if passage is ontologically real then the A-theory in 
some form must be true. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Paul 2010, 353, footnote 33. 
18 For a criticism of this aspect of Paul’s view see Dainton 2011, 388-389 and 
Dainton 2012, 130-33. 
19 Barry Dainton claims that “if our universe is of the Block variety then it is 
certainly the case that no form of M-passage exists—this holds by definition. But 
we can be certain that E-passage exists, as certain as we are of anything and we can 
conclude from this that our universe contains at least one significant form of 
passage—that certain regions of it have an inherently dynamic intrinsic nature. And 
this result holds even if our universe is entirely devoid of any form of M-passage.” 
(Dainton 2012, 132.) Note, here too, the assumption is that if mind-independent 
(metaphysical) passage exists, then it must be A-theoretic. 
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 For the Russellian, the vague truth that we start off from is that 
time has a dynamic character. There is a flow, flux or whoosh to time 
and that is something that is given to us in our immediate experience. 
This experience is open to many different ontological interpretations, but 
the real truth that underlies the experience and is its ontological ground, 
is the existence of unanalyzable temporal relations between temporal 
objects. The R-theorist who is a phenomenological realist will reject the 
view that our experience of passage is an illusion or an appearance that 
“misrepresent the non-dynamic external physical reality.”20 Our 
experience of the dynamic aspect of time is not a mind-dependent object 
that misrepresents reality, but is a mind-independent reality that is 
grounded in a temporal (dynamic) simple R-relation that is different 
from all other relations. Thus, it is a mistake to claim that there is a 
distinction between the succession as we experience it and succession as 
it is in itself; the former being dynamic and illusory and the latter static 
and real. In our experience of the phenomenon of succession which 
grounds the dynamic aspect of time we are directly acquainted with an 
R-theoretic mind-independent feature of reality. To think otherwise is to 
assume that the dynamic aspect of time is A-theoretic and that is what a 
Russellian will deny. 
 I have argued that the R-theory is realist in that it countenances 
simple and unanalyzable mind-independent temporal relations and that 
these relations are the ontological ground of the dynamic aspect of the 
temporal phenomena. To see that the R-theory is realist in a further 
sense, I want to turn next to two questions concerning the ontological 
status of temporal relations: First, are they universal or particular, and 
second, how are the facts that temporal relations enter into related to 
time? With these questions we hit upon the realism/nominalism issue as 
it applies to temporal relations. In briefly exploring them we shall once 
again see how the R-theory differs from the B-theory in at least one of 
its typical formulations and more importantly how the R-theory’s 
realism can account for both the dynamic and, in a sense to be explained, 
the eternal aspects of time.  
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 D.M. Armstrong is a B-theorist who in one of his more recent 
writings wrote that: 
 
If you are, like me, an omnitemporalist, holding that past, present and 
future are equally real, then the fact that there are truths about the past 
and about the future should not be reflected in the ontology of states 
of affairs. There are, of course, states of affairs involving temporal 
relations, but that is all.21  
 
 In claiming that past, present and future are equally real B-
theorists are somewhat obfuscating because they also maintain that no 
event really is past, present or future. Leaving such matters aside, the 
question I want to explore, vis á vis the nominalism/realism issue is 
Armstrong’s position regarding temporal relations and the states of 
affairs or facts they enter into.  
 Armstrong is a naturalist who believes that the spatio-temporal 
universe contains all that there is, and yet he believes in universals. 
Thus, he believes that the non-relational qualities of things exist at the 
spatiotemporal location of the particulars that exemplify them. What 
then of temporal relations? If they too are concrete then where, or better, 
when are they located? Armstrong offers two responses to this 
challenging question. 
 One the one hand, Armstrong suggests that causal theories of time 
would solve the problem of the location of temporal relations since “they 
identify temporal and spatial relations with causal relations, or at least 
analyze the holding of temporal and spatial relations in terms of the 
holding of causal relations.”22 Whatever virtues the causal theory of time 
has, and for the R-theorist there is little to recommend it, the causal 
theory does nothing to resolve the problem of the localization of 
temporal relations. A world of causally related particulars, that is, 
instantiated universals, simply raises the question of the location of the 
causal relation, it does not answer it.  
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22 Armstrong 2009, 112. 
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 On the other hand, Armstrong claims that even if temporal 
relations are not located in space-time, it does not follow that they are 
“outside of space and time”. For it is part of the essence of space and 
time that they involve such spatiotemporal relations, whether these be 
conceived of as relations between things, or between particular places 
and times. So if they help to constitute space-time, then it is no objection 
to their spatiotemporality that they are not located in space-time.23  
 I find this reply unavailing. If spatiotemporal relations help to 
constitute space-time then surely they are constituents of space-time and 
so are in need of categorization. If spatiotemporal relations are in time, 
then on the relational view, they would be things that stand in temporal 
relations, or on the absolute view they would be things that occupy 
moments of time, and so in either case they would not be the relations 
between things or moments they are intended to be. On the other hand, if 
temporal relations are not located in space-time then Armstrong’s 
naturalism fails.  
 A similar dilemma arises regarding his analysis of states of affairs 
involving temporal relations. If temporal relational states of affairs are 
concrete, that is, if they exist in time, then either the conjunction of all 
such states of affairs would exist at the same time or each relational 
temporal fact would exist at a different time. If all temporal relational 
states of affairs exist at the same time then the world would truly be a 
(simultaneous) Block universe; a totum simul, which is absurd. If each 
temporal relational fact exists at a different time, then whether time is 
absolute or relational, the need for a second time dimension would be 
required and an infinite regress would ensue. To be more specific, if 
E(a,b) exists at t1 and E(c,d) exists at t2 and so on, then in addition to 
temporal relational states of affairs, there are the absolute moments at 
which they exist. The series of moments would be a second time 
dimension at which the first temporal relational states of affairs exist. 
Since these moments, t1, t2, … tn would themselves stand in temporal 
relations, and so comprise temporal relational states of affairs, they too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Cf. Armstrong 2009, 112. 
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would occupy moments of time in a third dimension that stand in 
temporal relations to each other and so on ad infinitum. 
 An analogous problem exists on the relational view of time. For if 
temporal relational facts themselves stood in temporal relations then 
these second order temporal relational facts would exist in time and so 
require a third time dimension of temporal relational facts again 
resulting in an infinite regress. On the other hand, if the facts that have 
temporal relations as constituents are abstract and so outside of time, 
then, once again, Armstrong’s naturalism fails. 
 Contrast Armstrong with the R-theory. For the Russellian temporal 
relational states of affairs or R-facts while they are not themselves in 
time are indeed temporal since they contain temporal relations. R-facts 
are entities in their own right over and above their constituents, and as 
such they are not in time in that they do not exemplify non-relational 
temporal properties, occupy moments or stand in temporal relations. In 
that sense time, understood as a Russellian series composed of a 
conjunction of R-facts, is timeless. This view gives some meaning to an 
aphorism I favor, namely, time is timeless, or eternal in just this sense: 
though time contains temporal relations, time does not exemplify them. 
Time is timeless in the further sense that the ontological ground of 
temporal phenomena are relations and on the R-theory relational 
universals such as “occurring earlier than” are timeless.24 
 Given a realist ontology of R-relations and R-facts, the Russellian 
theory is able to account for both the dynamic and the eternal aspects of 
time. That both aspects are part of the reality of time is stated by an early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 There are, of course, philosophers who hold a B-theoretic ontology and maintain 
that there are universals. There are also philosophers who hold that temporal 
relational facts do not exist in time and that temporal relations are mind-
independent and the ground of the transitory aspect of time, at least in one sense of 
that phrase. What seems to me, however, and what makes the R-theory distinctive is 
that there is no B-theorist who explicitly adopts all of these tenets and for that 
reason it is, I submit legitimate to distinguish the R-theory and the B-theory. And 
there should be no question that the R-theory, which takes R-relations as 
fundamental, is not to be confused with any version of the A-theory. For while A-
theorists attempt to ground the truth of propositions about temporal relations 
between objects, none of them do or could by appealing to R-relations. 
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R-theorist, R.M. Blake, in his critique of Broad’s open future theory. In 
Scientific Thought (and elsewhere, of course) Broad maintains that the 
Russellian view leaves out something that is fundamental to the nature 
of time. Blake raises and responds to Broad’s objection in the following 
passage that I shall quote at length. 
 
His [Broad’s] concept of an unanalyzable “becoming” is very similar 
to M.  Bergson’s equally ultimate “duration” and to Mr. Whitehead’s 
“passage of  nature,” or “moving on” (Concept of Nature, p. 54). As 
Mr. Broad says (p. 59), “We are naturally tempted to regard the 
history of the world as existing eternally in a certain order of events.” 
The trouble with this is that it seems to take the temporal character of 
succession out of time and to make it “static,” or, as M. Bergson puts 
it, to “spatialize” time. Now there seems to me to be a strange mixture 
of truth an illusion in all this. There is certainly a unique character 
about time which cannot be reduced to anything else. Time is filled 
with “events, and events are happenings,” things that “come to pass,” 
that succeed one another in a fixed direction of earlier and later. This 
feature of time is revealed to us in our immediate experience of 
duration and the passage of events. But we may be equally certain 
that, however much of succession there may be in events, every event 
has in the order of succession just the place that it has and none other. 
The order as a whole, however much it may be an order of change and 
of succession, must in a sense be “static,” for it must be true that it is 
what it is. Let fluidity be never so fluid, the fact that it is so remains 
unaltered. These are simply the necessities of logic.25 
 
 Blake is attempting to reconcile the fundamental features of our 
experience of time and its true nature; that time has an unique and 
irreducible character that distinguishes it from space that is revealed to 
us through our experience of the succession of events, on the one hand, 
with the notion that time forms an ordered series of terms in which every 
item has just the place it has and no other, and that the whole 
conjunction of facts is unchanging, on the other. I am suggesting that to 
understand these two aspects of time one must recognize that time 
contains timeless yet dynamic relations and temporal yet eternal facts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Blake 1925, 434-35, emphasis added. 
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To countenance R-facts in addition to R-relations is crucial to providing 
a ground for the unchanging character of time as a whole and the 
dynamic nature of time within it.  
 J.S. Mackenzie has nicely stated the relation between the eternal 
and the dynamic in the following passage: 
 
There is no time outside the process. Hence the process as a whole 
might be said to be eternal though every particular part in it has a 
place in time. The eternal thus conceived would not be timeless, but 
rather that which included the whole of time […] The process as a 
whole, when we thus conceive of it, is not in time, rather time is in the 
process. Time is simply the aspect of successiveness which the eternal 
process contains.26 
  
Once we have made the relevant distinctions and provided an 
epistemologically, phenomenologically and ontologically realist analysis 
of the temporal relations and facts of which they are constituents, we 
arrive at a view that differs from the various versions of the B-theory 
and can justly be called “Temporal Realism.” Whether this view can be 
defended against further criticism is a question that lies beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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